Abstract. Privacy ampli cation allows two parties Alice and Bob knowing a partially secret string S to extract, by communication over a public channel, a shorter, highly secret string S 0 . Bennett, Brassard, Cr epeau, and Maurer showed that the length of S 0 can be almost equal to the conditional R enyi entropy of S given an opponent Eve's knowledge. All previous results on privacy ampli cation assumed that Eve has access to the public channel but is passive or, equivalently, that messages inserted by Eve can be detected by Alice and Bob. In this paper we consider privacy ampli cation secure even against active opponents. First it is analyzed under what conditions information-theoretically secure authentication is possible even though the common key is only partially secret. This result is used to prove that privacy ampli cation can be secure against an active opponent and that the size of S 0 can be almost equal to Eve's min-entropy about S minus 2n=3 if S is an n-bit string. Moreover, it is shown that for su ciently large n privacy ampli cation is possible when Eve's min-entropy about S exceeds only n=2 rather than 2n=3.
protocols such as protocols in quantum cryptography and secret-key agreement by public discussion 8].
Before we formalize the main problem considered in this paper, we give some de nitions and state previous results on privacy ampli cation.
Entropy Measures
We recall the de nitions of some entropy measures we need in this paper. We assume that the reader is familiar with the basic information-theoretic concepts.
For a good introduction, we refer to 4]. Let R be a discrete random variable with range R. Then the (Shannon) entropy H(R) is de ned as H(R) := ? X r2R P R (r) log(P R (r)) :
The R enyi entropy H 2 (R) is de ned as Finally, the min-entropy H 1 (R) is H 1 (R) := ? log max r2R (P R (r)) :
It is not di cult to see that for any random variable R the entropy measures H, H 2 , and H 1 satisfy H(R) H 2 (R) H 1 (R) H 2 (R)=2 : Equality of the rst three expressions holds if and only if R is uniformly distributed over some set, in which case this value is the logarithm of the cardinality of this set.
Universal and Strongly Universal Hashing
In the technique presented in this paper, hashing is used for two di erent purposes: universal hashing for privacy ampli cation and strongly universal hashing for authentication.
De nition 1. A class F of functions A ! B is called universal 2 (or simply universal) if, for any x 1 ; x 2 in A with x 1 6 = x 2 , the probability that f(x 1 ) = f(x 2 ) is at most 1=jBj when f is chosen from F according to the uniform distribution.
The following is a well-known example of such a class of hash functions f0; 1g n ! f0; 1g r containing 2 n distinct functions. Let b 2 GF(2 n ), and interpret x 2 A = f0; 1g n also as an element of GF(2 n ). Consider the function f b assigning to the argument x the rst r bits of the element b x of GF(2 n ). The set of these functions f b for b 2 GF(2 n ) is a universal class of functions for 1 r n.
De nition 2. Let " > 0. A class H of (hash) functions A ! B is called "-almost-strongly-universal 2 (or "-ASU 2 for short) if the following two conditions are satis ed:
1. For every a 2 A and b 2 B, the number of functions h 2 H with h(a) = b is jHj=jBj. 2 . For every distinct a 1 ; a 2 2 A and for every b 1 ; b 2 2 B, the number of hash functions h 2 H for which both h(a 1 ) = b 1 and h(a 2 ) = b 2 hold is at most " jHj=jBj.
An (1=jBj)-ASU 2 class is also called strongly-universal 2 (or SU 2 ).
Some constructions of "-ASU 2 classes are described in 12], and lower bounds on the size of such classes are proved. An SU 2 class of functions mapping nbit strings to n-bit strings can be constructed similarly to the universal class described above: the class H = fh ab : (a; b) 2 (GF (2 n )) 2 g, where h ab (x) := a x+b, is an SU 2 class of hash functions f0; 1g n ! f0; 1g n with 2 2n elements. It is shown in 12] that "-ASU 2 classes can be obtained which are close to stronglyuniversal, but substantially smaller.
Privacy Ampli cation by Authenticated Public Discussion
Bennett et. al. 1] analyzed the privacy ampli cation technique of 2] under the assumption that the two parties Alice and Bob are connected by an authentic (but otherwise insecure) channel, or equivalently, that the opponent is not able to insert or modify messages without being detected. The idea of this technique is to take a hash value of the string S as the highly secret key. More precisely, Alice chooses a hash function h at random from a universal class and sends this function to Bob. Then they both compute S 0 := h(S).
It was shown that the amount of almost secret key that can be extracted is at least equal to the conditional R enyi entropy H 2 of S, given Eve's knowledge U = u. This fact is an immediate consequence of the following result of 1] which states that if a random variable X is used as the argument of universal hashing, where the output Y is an r-bit string, and r is equal to H 2 (X) minus a security parameter, then the resulting string Y has almost maximal Shannon entropy r, given the hash function (which is chosen uniformly from the universal class). Theorem 3. 1] Let X be a random variable with probability distribution P X and R enyi entropy H 2 (X), and let G be the random variable corresponding to the random choice (with uniform distribution) of a member of a universal class of hash functions mapping X to r-bit strings, and let Y = G(X). Then r H(Y jG) H 2 (Y jG) r ? 2 r?H2(X) ln 2 :
Of course the theorem also holds when all the probabilities are conditioned on a particular event (e.g., U = u).
Privacy Ampli cation by NOT Authenticated Public Discussion
In this paper we consider the generalized problem of privacy ampli cation when dropping the condition that the channel connecting the two parties Alice and Bob be authentic, i.e., privacy ampli cation secure even against active adversaries who are able to insert or modify messages.
Privacy ampli cation is often used as the nal phase of unconditional secretkey agreement. In 6], it was investigated under what conditions secret-key agreement by not authenticated public discussion is possible when the parties Alice, Bob, and Eve have access to random variables X, Y , and Z, respectively (the \initialization phase"). Several impossibility results were shown, whereas a positive result was derived in 6] only for the special case where the information that the parties obtain consists of many independent repetitions of a random experiment. Privacy ampli cation, which was not treated in 6], corresponds to the situation where X = Y , and where the random experiment is not repeated.
We make precise what we mean by a protocol for privacy ampli cation by communication over a non-authentic insecure channel. Assume that two parties Alice and Bob both know a random variable S, for example an n-bit string, and that the adversary Eve has some information about S. Let again the random variable U summarize Eve's entire information about the random variable S. In the following, all the results are stated for some particular value u 2 U (where U is the range of the random variable U), i.e., for a xed event U = u, and hence all the probabilities are conditioned on U = u. The type of the opponent's information about S is not necessarily precisely speci ed, i.e., P SjU=u is not assumed to be known. However, the amount of information is limited in some way, for example in terms of the conditional min-entropy.
Formally, a protocol for privacy ampli cation consists of two phases. During the rst phase (the communication phase), Alice and Bob exchange messages C 1 ; C 2 ; : : : over some channel (where Alice sends the messages C 1 ; C 3 ; : : :, and Bob sends C 2 ; C 4 ; : : :). Each of these messages can depend on the sender's knowledge when sending the message and some random bits. In the second phase, both parties decide whether they accept or reject the outcome of the protocol. In case of acceptance, Alice and Bob compute strings S 0 A and S 0 B , respectively. (Note that it is not required that Alice and Bob are synchronized in the sense that they both either reject or accept. This would be impossible to achieve in the presence of an active adversary, who could for instance delete all messages from Alice to Bob after Alice has accepted.) De nition 4 de nes security of such a protocol.
De nition 4. A protocol is called an (n; l; n 0 ; "; )-protocol for privacy amplication over an insecure and non-authentic channel if it is a protocol for privacy ampli cation with the following properties. If there exists a random variable S with jSj 2 n (i.e., we can assume that S f0; 1g n ) that is known to Alice and Bob, and such that given Eve's entire knowledge U = u about S, the conditional min-entropy of S is at least l, i.e., Bob. In the case of an active adversary, with probability at least 1? one of the following conditions must be satis ed: either the adversary's presence is detected by at least one of the two parties (who hence rejects), or Alice and Bob both accept and successfully agree on a common string S 0 (= S 0 A = S 0 B ) satisfying (1). This de nition can be generalized to di erent ways of limiting Eve's knowledge about S, for example in terms of the R enyi entropy instead of the minentropy.
Outline
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we investigate the general problem of information-theoretically secure message authentication under the (weakened) condition that two parties share a partially (rather than completely) secret key. In Section 3 we show a rst result concerning privacy ampli cation. It states that privacy ampli cation (by communication over a nonauthentic channel) is possible if Eve's min-entropy about S exceeds two thirds of the length n of the string, and the maximal length of the generated highly secret string is roughly H 1 (SjU = u) ?2n=3. In Section 4 it is demonstrated that this result is not optimal: it is su cient that Eve's min-entropy about S is greater than half of the length of the string (where the length of the extracted highly secret string is a constant fraction of H 1 (SjU = u) ? n=2) if the string is suciently long. Section 5 provides evidence that some of the results of Sections 2, 3, and 4 are optimal, and Section 6 states some open problems.
2 Unconditionally-Secure Authentication with a Partially Secret Key
All previous results on unconditionally-secure authentication require a key that is completely secret, i.e., the opponent's a priori probability distribution of the key is uniform. In this section we consider authentication where the opponent is allowed to have some partial information about the key. There exists a variety of constructive results as well as impossibility results on information-theoretically secure authentication (see for example 11], 7], or 12]). The following two types of attacks are possible. In an impersonation attack, the opponent tries to generate a (correctly authenticated) message, and in a substitution attack, the adversary observes a correctly authenticated message and tries to replace it by a di erent correctly authenticated message. The success probabilities are denoted by p imp and p sub , respectively. (General lower bounds on these probabilities are given in 7].)
One possibility for realizing information-theoretically secure authentication is by using strongly-universal (or almost-strongly-universal) classes of hash functions (see for example 12]). The secret key then determines a hash function of the class, and the message is authenticated by appending its hash value. The authentication code corresponding to an "-ASU 2 class of hash function satis es p imp = 1=jBj and p sub " :
There are also di erent ways to realize authentication codes than with strongly universal hashing. One example is given in 5], where a construction is described with a smaller amount of secret key, but which requires more communication.
Let us now investigate the general scenario in which the key is not entirely secret, i.e., where the opponent Eve has a certain amount of information about the key. We rst prove a bound on the information that is gained by Eve when observing a correctly authenticated message. The following lemma states that the min-entropy of the key, given Eve's information U = u, decreases by more than the length of the authenticator only with exponentially small probability. (A related result for di erent entropy measures is proved in 3].) For simplicity, the condition U = u is omitted in the lemma and the proof. Of course the analogous result holds also when all the probabilities are conditioned on U = u.
Lemma5. Let S, X, and Y be arbitrary discrete random variables (with ranges S, X, and Y, respectively) such that S and X are independent (i.e., P SX = P S P X ). Then for all real numbers`> 0 This inequality implies that P SjXY (s; x; y) = P SXY (s; x; y) P XY (x; y) = P S (s) P X (x) P Y jSX (y; s; x) P X (x) P Y jX (y; x) P S (s) P Y jX (y; x) P S (s) p 0 = P S (s) jYj 2`; holds with probability greater than 1?2 ?`( over values x and y). The statement of the lemma follows by maximizing over all s 2 S, and by taking negative logarithms.
2
We will show in Section 5 that the bounds of this lemma (and hence also those of the following theorem) are almost tight.
We can now prove a result concerning authentication with a partially secret key which states that information-theoretically secure authentication is possible under the sole condition that no conditional probability of a certain key, given Eve's information, exceeds a bound which is roughly 1= p jSj. Theorem 6. Assume that two parties Alice and Bob have access to a random variable S, which is a binary string of length n (n even), and that S is used as the key in the authentication scheme based on strongly-universal hashing described in Section 2. Assume further that an adversary Eve knows a random variable U, jointly distributed with S according to some probability distribution, and that Eve has no further information about S. Let H 1 (SjU = u) 1 2 + t n for a particular realization u of U, and let D be the event that Eve can either insert a message (successful impersonation attack) or modify a message sent by Alice or Bob (successful substitution attack) without being detected. Then for every strategy, the conditional probability of D, given U = u, can be upper bounded as follows:
(2) holds under the condition that the correctly authenticated message observed by Eve is independent of S, given U = u.
Remark. Note that in Theorem 6 it need not be assumed that the message observed by Eve be independent of S (but independent of S given U = u). For example (2) holds also when the message is selected by Eve herself.
Proof. First we prove an upper bound on the success probability p imp of the impersonation attack. For every possible message x 2 GF(2 n=2 ) and for every authenticator y 2 GF(2 n=2 ) there exist exactly 2 n=2 possible keys such that the authentication is correct. The probability of such a set of keys, given U = u, is upper bounded by 2 n=2 2 ?H1(SjU=u) 2 n=2 2 ?(1=2+t)n = 2 ?tn ; and hence p imp 2 ?tn :
In a substitution attack the adversary sees a message-authentication pair (X; Y ) 2 GF(2 n=2 ) 2 , where X is independent of S given U = u. According to Lemma 5 (applied to distributions conditioned on U = u), we have for every r > 0 that H 1 (SjX = x; Y = y; U = u) n 2 + tn ? log jYj ? rn = (t ? r)n holds with probability greater than 1 ? 2 ?rn . A successful substitution attack immediately yields the key S = (A; B) because the equations Y = AX +B (from the observed message) and Y 0 = AX 0 + B (from the modi ed message) uniquely determine the key (and can e ciently be solved). Hence the success probability of such an attack can be upper bounded as follows: p sub < 2 ?rn 1 + (1 ? 2 ?rn ) 2 ?(t?r)n < 2 ?rn + 2 ?(t?r)n : (3) The reason for this is that with probability greater than 1 ? 2 ?rn , the maximal probability of a particular key is at most 2 ?(t?r)n . Inequality (3) is true for every r > 0; the choice r = t=2 gives p sub 2 2 ?tn=2 = 2 ?(tn=2?1) : The probability P(DjU = u) is equal to the maximum of p imp and p sub , given U = u. This concludes the proof. 2 
Privacy Ampli cation with Universal Hashing
The results in this and the next section are of the following type: If the minentropy of a partially secret string S of length n, given the opponent's knowledge, is greater than a certain fraction of n, then Alice and Bob can, by communication over a non-authentic and insecure channel, agree on a common string about which Eve has virtually no information. The maximal length of the resulting highly secret string depends on Eve's knowledge about S and the security conditions. The idea is to use the partially secret string in a rst step to authenticate a message containing the description of a function from a suitable class of hash functions. In the second step, this hash function is used for privacy ampli cation, and the string is used again as the input to this hash function. There are two possibilities to proceed: one can divide the string into two parts and use the rst part for authentication and the remaining part as the argument for the nal privacy ampli cation. The second possibility is to use the whole string for both authentication and as argument for privacy ampli cation. The disadvantage of the second possibility is that the authenticator gives Eve information about the argument of the hashing. A drawback of the rst method is that Eve's information about S could be about either string (in fact about both, see below).
However, the following lemma implies a tight bound on Eve's information about substrings.
Lemma7. Let S = (S 1 ; S 2 ; : : : ; S n ) be a random variable consisting of n binary random variables. For any k-tuple i = (i 1 ; i 2 : : : ; i k ), where 1 i 1 < i 2 < : : : < i k n, let S i be the string (S i1 ; S i2 ; : : : ; S i k ). Then
Proof. A string (s i1 ; s i2 ; : : : ; s i k ) corresponds to exactly 2 n?k strings (s 1 ; : : : ; s n ). Hence the maximal probability of such a k-bit string is at most 2 n?k times the maximal probability of a string in S, i.e., H 1 (S) ? H 1 (S i ) n ? k.
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Remark. Note that when the string S is split into two parts S l and S r , then the bounds of Lemma 7 applied to S l and S r are tight simultaneously. For example let s = (s l ; s r ) be a particular n-bit string, and let s l and s r be the rst and second half of s. De ne (for some v n=2 ? 1) P S ((s l ; s)) = P S ((s; s r )) := 2 v?n for all n=2-bit strings s (and a uniform distribution for the remaining n-bit strings), i.e., H 1 (S) = n ? v. Then H 1 (S l ) = H 1 (S r ) = n=2 ? v = H 1 (S) ? n=2 :
Intuitively speaking but counter to intuition, Eve's information about S in terms of min-entropy appears entirely in both substrings S l and S r .
The following theorem states that if Eve's knowledge (in terms of H 1 ) is less than one third of the length of the entire string (this is an intuitive, but somewhat imprecise description of H 1 (SjU = u) > 2n=3), then privacy ampli cation by not authenticated public discussion is possible using two thirds of the string to authenticate a hash function from a universal class, and the remaining third as the input to the hash function. We can assume that the length of the string is divisible by 3 (otherwise Alice and Bob discard one or two bits).
Theorem 8. For every n (multiple of 3) and for all positive numbers t 1=3 and r such that (t ? r)n is a positive integer, there exists a n ; (2=3 + t)n ; (t ? r)n ; 2 ?rn = ln 2 ; 2 ?(tn=2?1) -protocol for privacy ampli cation over an insecure and non-authentic channel.
Proof. Let n = 3k, and let S be the random variable known to Alice and Bob where S f0; 1g n . Let further U be the opponent Eve's information about S, and let nally H 1 (SjU = u) 2 3 + t n for a particular u 2 U. We denote by S 1 the string consisting of the rst 2k = 2n=3 bits of S (more precisely, S 1 is interpreted as a pair (A; B) of elements of GF(2 k )), and by S 2 the remaining k bits (i.e., S 2 2 GF(2 k )). The idea of the protocol is to use S 1 for authenticating an element of the universal class of hash functions described in Section 1, and S 2 as the input to this function. According to Lemma 7 applied to conditional distributions (with respect to U = u), H 1 (S 1 jU = u) 1 3 + t n and H 1 (S 2 jU = u) tn :
Alice randomly chooses an element X of GF(2 k ), which she sends to Bob together with the authenticator Y = AX + B (see Section 2). According to Theorem 6, the probability P(DjU = u) of undetected modi cation is bounded by P(DjU = u) 2 ?(tn=2?1) : Let the hash function be speci ed by X (see Section 1). The argument S 2 of the hash function satis es H 2 (S 2 jU = u) H 1 (S 2 jU = u) tn : Let S 0 be the rst (t?r)n bits of S 2 X (where the product is taken in GF (2 k 
Privacy Ampli cation with Extractors
It appears that the condition in Theorem 8 on Eve's min-entropy about S can be weakened if the description of the hash function is shorter. Extractors are a method for extracting all or part of the min-entropy of a random source into an almost uniformly distributed string by requiring only a small amount of truly random bits. By using extractors instead of universal hashing for privacy ampli cation, we show that privacy ampli cation can be secure against an active opponent, provided his min-entropy about S exceeds half of the length of the string. The length of the resulting secret string can be a constant fraction of Eve's min-entropy about S minus n=2.
In 10], extractors are de ned as follows (for an introduction to the theory of extractors, see for example 9] or 10]).
De nition 9. 10] A function E : f0; 1g n f0; 1g w ! f0; 1g n 0 is called a ( ; " 0 )-extractor if for any distribution P on f0; 1g n with min-entropy H 1 (P ) n, the distance of the distribution of V; E(X; V )] to the uniform distribution of f0; 1g w+n 0 is at most " 0 when choosing X according to P and V according to the uniform distribution in f0; 1g w . The distance between two distributions P and P 0 on a set X is de ned as jP(x) ? P 0 (x)j :
Various possible constructions of extractors have been described. The following theorem of 10] states that it is possible to extract a constant fraction of the min-entropy of a given source where the number of required random bits is polynomial in the logarithm of the length of the string and in log(1=" 0 ). Theorem 10. 10] For any parameters = (n) and " 0 = " 0 (n) with 1=n 1=2 and 2 ? n " 0 1=n, there exists an e ciently computable ( ; " 0 )-extractor E : f0; 1g n f0; 1g w ! f0; 1g n 0 , where w = O(log(1=" 0 ) (log n) 2 (log(1= ))= ) and n 0 = ( 2 n= log(1= )).
We also need the following lemma, which states that a random variable whose distribution is close to uniform (in terms of the distance d) has a Shannon entropy close to maximal. Lemma the inequality is trivially satis ed. The distribution P Z of Z can be thought of as obtained from the uniform distribution U k by increasing some of the probabilities (by total amount d) and decreasing some others (by the same total amount).
The function d dp (?p log p) = ? ln p + 1 ln 2 is monotonically decreasing, hence increasing decreasing] a smaller probability increases decreases] the entropy more than modifying a greater probability by the same amount. Hence a distribution with distance d from U k with minimal entropy can be obtained by adding d to one of the probabilities, and by reducing as many probabilities as possible to 0, leaving the other probabilities unchanged.
One of the probabilities of the new distribution equals 2 ?k +d, b2 k dc probabilities are equal to 0, one probability equals 2 ?k (2 k d ? b2 k dc) ( Theorem 12 below states that if Eve's min-entropy about S is greater than half of the length of S, then a constant (where this constant is not explicitly speci ed) fraction of the di erence of this entropy and half of the length of S (plus a security parameter) can be extracted by privacy ampli cation using public discussion over a non-authentic channel, provided that S is su ciently long. In contrast to the proof of Theorem 8, the entire string S is used twice here: once for authentication, and once as the input of the extractor. Theorem 12. Let t and r be positive numbers such that r < t < 1=2. There exists a constant c with the following property. Let " 0 (n) be a function such that lim n!1 n p " 0 (n) = 0 (4) and " 0 (n) = 2 ?o(n)=(log n) 2 (5) (i.e., log(1=" 0 (n)) (log n) 2 =n ! 0 for n ! 1). Then there exists a bound n 0 such that for all n n 0 there exists an n 0 c(t ? r)n and an n ; (1=2 + t)n ; n 0 ; n 0 2 p " 0 (n) + 2 ?rn + 2 ?n 0 ; 2 ?(tn=2?1) -protocol for privacy ampli cation over an insecure and non-authentic channel.
Remark. The function " 0 (n) is directly related to the tolerable amount of information that Eve obtains about the key S 0 as a function of the length n of the string S. Possible functions " 0 (n) satisfying both (4) and (5) are " 0 (n) = 2 ?n=(log n) 3 , " 0 (n) = 2 ?n for any 0 < < 1, or " 0 (n) = 1=(n 2 (log n) 2 ). The choice of a more restrictive " 0 (n) with respect to Eve's knowledge increases the bound n 0 . Proof. The number w of random bits required as the second part of the input for a ( ; " 0 )-extractor according to Theorem 10, where = t ? r is constant, is w = O(log(1=" 0 ) (log n) 2 ) ; (6) and the length n 0 of the output is ((t ? r)n), i.e., n 0 c(t ? r)n for some constant c.
Because of (5) and (6) there exists an n 0 (depending on " 0 (n)) such that n n 0 implies w n=2. Let n n 0 (and we can assume that n is even).
The message sent from Alice to Bob is a random element X 2 GF(2 n=2 ) (of which the rst w bits are used as the second input V to the extractor) and is authenticated by Y = S 1 X + S 2 2 GF(2 n=2 ), i.e., the authentication scheme based on strongly universal hashing (see Section 2) is used with S as partially secret key, and where S 1 and S 2 are the rst and second half of S, interpreted as elements of GF (2 n=2 ). According to Theorem 6, Eve's probability of undetected modi cation satis es P(DjU = u) 2 ?(tn=2?1) : Lemma 5 implies that H 1 (SjX = x; Y = y; U = u) (t ? r)n (7) holds with probability greater than 1 ? 2 ?rn . We can assume that (t ? r)n is an integer. If (7) holds, the extractor's output satis es d( V; E(S; V )]; U w+n 0 ) " 0 (n) : (8) 
